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INTRODUCTION 
 
  Legal education has always been shaped by the underlying economic realities of the 
educational system and the legal profession. The earliest formal legal education in America 
developed as practitioners sought to supplement their incomes by taking on apprentices.
2 
Langdell’s case method, for all its other virtues, ultimately became a dominant paradigm largely 
because it allowed large class sizes, and thus cheap education.
3 The rise of the clinical movement 
in legal education coincided with a period of unprecedented prosperity and growth in the legal 
                                                 
1. The Author would like to thank Philip Burling, Dan Coquillette, Lawrence Fox, Jane Gionfriddo, John Manning, 
Michael Meltsner, John O’Brien, Amanda Pallais, Paul Tremblay, and David Wilkins for their comments and 
suggestions. 
2. See MARIAN C. MCKENNA, TAPPING REEVE AND THE LITCHFIELD LAW SCHOOL 60 (New York 1986). 
3. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 63 
(London 1983). 
  1market.
4 While the economic forces at play in these examples were not the only factors 
influencing the shape of legal education, they set both its boundaries and the goalposts. In other 
words, they helped to define both the constraints within which legal education had to operate and 
the objectives it was trying to achieve. 
The economic recession that began in the United States in December of 2007
5 will likely 
have a significant effect on both of these variables. The recession’s effects—rising tuition, scarce 
student loans, and a poor job market—are pushing legal education to the breaking point. Students 
at many schools can no long afford taking on debt of $100,000 or more for a marginal 
improvement in their job prospects. Consequently, most law schools cannot expect to continue 
raising tuition indiscriminately while still filling their ranks with qualified students. The 
boundaries are shrinking.  
At the same time, the recession is causing legal employers to put a premium on job 
candidates with practical skills—those on whom they will not have to spend time and money 
before they are ready to practice. Law schools that want to produce graduates competitive in 
such a market will thus have to adjust their priorities. No longer can schools continue to 
subsidize academic research at the expense of teaching practical skills to their graduates. 
Although law schools have long aimed to become a respected part of the university by producing 
academic scholarship, they now need to remember their initial place as professional schools 
whose chief goal is to produce graduates who can provide legal services. The goalposts are 
moving as well. 
                                                 
4. For a discussion of the funding of clinical legal education, see Margaret Martin Barry et al., Clinical Education 
for this Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 18–30 (2000). For a discussion of the rise of large law 
firms and their influence on legal education, see ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 
REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 75–85 (Chicago 1992) 
[hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]. 
5. Press Release, Nat. Bureau of Econ. Research, Determination of the December 2007 Peak in Economic Activity 
(Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/cycles/dec2008.html.  
  2This Paper traces the influence of the economic recession on legal education. Part I 
examines how the recession is influencing the market for legal services and provides some 
predictions about how the legal profession must change to adapt to this market. It concludes that 
graduates with practical training will be best situated to succeed in the emerging job market. Part 
II examines the difficulties that law schools have had in developing the kind of practical training 
the new job market will require. It then suggests that the recession may help to produce a change 
in priorities as students begin to seek law schools that best prepare them for the job market. Part 
III concludes with some suggestions about how the ABA Section of Legal Education and 
Admissions to the Bar can respond to the recession by helping to facilitate this transformation in 
law schools. It recommends first that the Section require law schools to provide more 
information to prospective students about the career prospects of their graduates. Second, it 
suggests that the Section adjust its accreditation standards so that schools have more freedom to 
incorporate adjunct faculty into their educational programs. 
I. THE CHANGING MARKET FOR LEGAL SERVICES 
  The economic recession of 2008-2009 has placed unprecedented stress on the legal 
profession. Although smaller downturns in 1990-1992 and 2000-2001 created similar problems, 
the current recession likely will outstrip them in duration and intensity.
6 The legal profession is 
thus entering uncharted waters. To fully understand how the market is likely to change the legal 
profession, however, one must first understand how the profession has operated in recent years. 
Because of its disproportionate influence on the profession, the best place to start such an inquiry 
is with the large Wall Street law firm. 
 
                                                 
6. HILDEBRANT, CLIENT ADVISORY 2 (2009), available at http://www.hildebrandt.com/PublicDocs/ 
CLIENT_ADVISORY/2009_Client_Advisory.pdf [hereinafter HILDEBRANT, CLIENT ADVISORY]. 
  3A.  The Traditional Large Law Firm Model 
  The large law firm model that has predominated in recent decades emerged during the 
1970s and 80s.
7 Under this model, law firms maintain a leveraged ratio of associates to partners, 
sometimes employing as many as five non-equity lawyers for every equity partner.
8 With about 
one-third of the revenue from each non-equity lawyer’s billable hours translating into profit,
9 
this model maximizes a firm’s profits per partner. For every new associate a law firm hires, 
profits increase, at least as long as there is enough work to keep everyone busy. This engi
prosperity comes with a large proviso, however. As younger lawyers move up the ranks, many of 
them must leave the firm to maintain the pyramid structure and the high profits.
ne for 
                                                
10 Firms using 
this model thus need to constantly hire a large number of new associates to replace the attorneys 
that leave the bottom of the pyramid.
11 
At the same time, however, a firm cannot scare away young associates too early, or it will 
not earn back the investment it has made in hiring and training the young lawyer. To solve this 
problem, the pyramid model must hold out a credible promise of promotion to partner for a 
certain number of associates. Because the number of promotions required to make such a 
promise credible usually exceeds the number of partners who wish to retire or leave, law firms 
using this model tend to grow over time. Indeed, one study found that to keep a constant ratio of 
associates to partner while still promoting the requisite number of associates, law firms must 
 
7. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 77. 
8. See Michael H. Trotter, A Pig in a Poke? The Uncertain Advantages of Very Large and Highly Leveraged Law 
Firms in America, in RAISE THE BAR: REAL WORLD SOLUTIONS FOR A TROUBLED PROFESSION 33, 35–36 (Lawrence 
J. Fox ed., Chicago 2007) [hereinafter RAISE THE BAR] (listing some of the 200 largest law firms in America with 
their leverage ratios in 2004, which range from 1.52 to 5.82, with the majority between two and three); see also 
MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 78. 
9. A.W. Thorner, Legal Education in the Recruitment Marketplace: Decades of Change, 1987 DUKE L.J. 276, 278. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. (calculating that because of this attrition, “[r]oughly three to four times the number of anticipated future 
partners ha[ve] to be hired at the associate level”). 
  4engage in exponential growth.
12 Consequently, the pyramid model causes law firms to engage in 
intense competition for top graduates of law schools, including ever-expanding associate salaries 
and lavish summer programs.
13 
B.  The Large Law Firm and Legal Education 
This model has had a profound influence on legal education, creating a situation in which 
law schools had little incentive to ensure that their graduates had sufficient practical training at 
graduation. Two factors contributed to this situation. 
First, the need to maintain the integrity of the pyramid model created an “apparently 
insatiable demand[] . . . for the annual crop of warm bodies.”
14 Law firms simply could not hire 
enough qualified applicants, and the hiring market swung to favor students seeking jobs. With 
too few law students to go around, employers of all kinds were hard pressed to hire enough 
students. One law school career services officer described the resulting recruitment frenzy as 
follows: 
Employers of all sizes and types vie for the best and brightest in the second- and third-
year classes of law schools across the nation. No longer is on-campus law school 
                                                 
12. See Marc Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Why the Big Get Bigger: The Promotion-to-Partner Tournament and 
the Growth of Large Law Firms, 76 VA. L. REV. 747, 780–83 (1990); see also MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, 
TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 77–120 (Chicago 1991). Professors 
Galanter and Palay’s “Promotion-to-Partner Tournament” model has become the dominant explanation of law firm 
growth. David B. Wilkins & Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and 
Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1581 (1998) 
(“Tournament theory has become the dominant academic model for analyzing the institutional structure of large law 
firms.”). Nonetheless, the theory has received some criticism. See, e.g., George Rutherglen & Kevin A. Kordana, A 
Farewell to Tournaments? The Need for an Alternative Explanation of Law Firm Structure and Growth, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 1695 (1998) (arguing that the need to maintain leverage and the inter-competition for associates provide a 
sufficient explanation); Randall S. Thomas et al., Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REV. 115 (arguing that the “demand-side” 
consideration of the increase in the demand for complex legal services is also a significant factor); Wilkins & Gulati, 
supra (arguing that firms use a variety of incentives, in addition to the tournament, to keep associates around and 
working hard). For a partial response to these criticisms, see Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, A Little Jousting 
About the Big Law Firm Tournament, 84 VA. L. REV. 1683 (1998). In any case, all of these commentators agree on 
the basic elements of large law firms in recent decades: high leverage, high associate attrition, a continual need to 
hire new associates, and a need to bring in more and more work, all driven by the basic desire to increase profits.  
13. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 79. 
14. R.B. McKay, The Rise of the Justice Industry and the Decline of Legal Ethics, 68 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 829, 846 
(1990); see also MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 82–85. 
  5recruiting the domain solely of the large firm or government agency. Within the last 
decade, medium and smaller firms, public interest organizations, corporations, and 
businesses have arranged interview dates nine to twelve months in advance of law 
students’ employment availability. More and more employers are requesting interviews 
with or direct contact from students at law schools of all sizes, geographic locations, and 
reputations. The recruitment process is no longer an intrusion into the academic calendar 
to be borne solely by a few select law schools.
15  
Employers were thus in a poor position to demand that their new hires possess training in 
practical skills. Instead, the imperatives of the job market meant that “an emphasis on convincing 
or enticing interested applicants to join the organization . . . replaced selection through 
evaluation of paper credentials.”
16 Throughout much of the 1980s and 90s, therefore, most law 
schools could promise their applicants excellent job prospects even if they did not have programs 
in place to impart practical skills. A law school could continue to raise tuition as the price for 
access to this job market without any corresponding obligation to improve its training, and the 
students would still come. 
  Second, the work that generally occupied new associates at the bottom level of the 
pyramid did not require extensive practical training. To make the model work, each partner at the 
top of the pyramid had to generate enough work for the two to six attorneys working below him 
in the pyramid. This work typically included wading through large discovery requests in 
complex litigation, document review, and basic research and writing.
17 As the ABA’s MacCrate 
                                                 
15. Thorner, supra note 9, at 280. Note that the recruiting frenzy had a trickle-down effect. Because large law firms 
were hiring so many associates, smaller firms, government agencies, and public interest organizations all had to 
increase their recruiting efforts as well, thus limiting their ability to demand more practical skills of their job 
applicants. 
16. Id. 
17. See Trotter, supra note 8, at 45. 
  6Report noted, “[l]aw schools shaped their curricula to respond to the needs of the corporate 
practice of large law firms,”
18 but these needs were not particularly demanding of practical 
skills. Firms had no expectation associates would arrive knowing how to do more complex tasks
and law schools had little incentive to provide such traini
, 
ng. 
                                                
The result of the pyramid organization of law firms was thus that young lawyers had little 
need to learn practical skills during law school. A survey of Chicago lawyers in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s indicated that for most lawyers, law school was the primary source of skills and 
knowledge in only a few areas: legal reasoning, substantive law, procedural law, legal research, 
and professional ethics.
19 In contrast, lawyers learned most of their practical skills during 
summer work experiences or from their first jobs, including oral communication, written 
communication, negotiation, counseling, legal problem solving, client relations, and drafting.
20 
Because law firms did not expect students to bring these skills with them to their first job,
21 
failure to acquire them in law school was not fatal to a student’s job prospects. The structure of 
the job market thus allowed schools to put skills training on the backburner. As the job market 
has broken down, however, this reality is beginning to change.  
 
 
 
 
 
18. MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 87. 
19. Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of Competence, 43 J. LEGAL ED. 469, 482 
(1993). A 1999 survey of Minnesota lawyers showed similar results. See John O. Sonsteng et al., A Legal Education 
Renaissance: A Practical Approach for the Twenty-First Century, 34 WM. MITCH. L. REV. 303, 378–81 & tbl.4 
(2007). 
20. Garth & Martin, supra note 19, at 482–87 & tbl. 6. 
21. See id. at 490 tbl.11 (noting that fewer than ten percent of law firm partners in Chicago expect new hires to be 
able to draft legal documents, counsel clients, conduct litigation, or engage in negotiation, while fewer than half 
expect them to be able to gather facts or to diagnose and find solutions for legal problems). 
  7C.  Changes in the Law Firm Market 
  The catalyst of the current troubles, as far as law firms are concerned, is a decline in 
demand for legal services.
22 The resulting downward pressure on law firm rates has nearly 
frozen the annual increase in fees upon which law firms have come to rely. Consequently, law 
firms are having difficulty bringing in enough work and revenue to support their highly 
leveraged structure and inflated associate salaries. In response, firms are shifting as much work 
as possible to lower paid staff attorneys or contract attorneys, while employing fewer high-paid 
associates.
23 Many firms have engaged in significant layoffs, while others are using pay cuts and 
delayed start dates to lower their labor costs.
24 
                                                
  All of these cost-saving trends are unremarkable for a market shaped by a deep recession. 
It is possible that, like all good businesses, law firms are simply adapting to a weak spot in the 
market and preparing to return to business as usual as soon as the economy improves. Many 
commentators, however, argue that the downturn will lead to more than a routine disruption in 
the legal market, and may spell the end of the traditional law firm model.
25 
  The reason for this dire prediction is that the natural tensions of the model were 
becoming unsustainable even before the economic troubles hit. As described above, the model 
places intense pressure on law firms to continue hiring top graduates from the best law schools to 
 
22. Martha Neil, Law Firm Consultant: ‘I’ve Never Seen It This Bad,’ ABAJOURNAL.COM, Feb. 24, 2009, 
http://www.abajournal.com/weekly/legal_consultant_ive_never_seen_it_this_bad (“Demand has been slow. 
Essentially the spigot of work has turned off, and law firms are working down their current inventory.”). 
23. V. Dion Haynes, Law Firms Tighten Belts—By Request, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2008, at D1; V. Dion Haynes, 
Recession Sends Lawyers Home: Firms Trade Brick-and-Mortar Prestige for a Better Business Model, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 9, 2009, at D1 [hereinafter Haynes, Recession Sends Lawyers Home].  
24. See Aric Press, The Coming Law Firm Hiring Crisis, LAW.COM, Feb. 17, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
article.jsp?id=1202428296289; Debra Weiss, 21,000 Legal Jobs Lost in Last Year, ABAJOURNAL.COM, Mar. 6, 
2009, http://www.abajournal.com/news/4200_legal_staffers_lost_jobs_in_february_labor_stats_show/. 
25. See, e.g., HILDEBRANT, CLIENT ADVISORY, supra note 6, at 11 (“[W]e . . . believe that this recession is significantly 
different from prior ones and that it could result in some fundamental changes in the way law firms are structured and 
how they approach their work.”); Deborah L. Cohen, End of the road for the 'Cravath model'? Some law profs, firms 
see potential for a sea change, ABA J., Nov. 2008, at 36; Paul Lippe, Law Firms’ 2011 Scenario and the End of 
Leverage, LAW.COM, Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202428174244. 
  8replace associates on the bottom tier of the pyramid who have left or ascended to partner. Law 
firms’ attempts to remain competitive in this hiring market caused associate starting salaries to 
remain nearly uniform while rising to $160,000 just before the recession hit.
26 Once the 
associates had been hired, however, law firms had to get their money’s worth by requiring large 
numbers of billable hours.
27 The greater demands on associates then increased attrition which, in 
turn, required law firms to hire even more new lawyers.
28 The entire system was dependent on 
enough work coming in to fill everyone’s time. Because this cycle had repeated for a number of 
years, law firms were highly vulnerable to a sudden decrease in demand for their services.  
  This situation has become even more precarious in light of the decreasing loyalty of 
lawyers to their firms and vice-versa. Professors Marc Galanter and William Henderson have 
documented the shift from the basic tournament model of law firms to a more “elastic model,” 
which “promotes, laterally hires, or de-equitizes partners in order to maximize profits for a 
proportionately smaller equity class.”
29 Thus, the prize of equity partnership no longer held the 
promise of security, even as it became more rare.
30 This trend further undermined the incentive 
structure of the traditional law firm model. 
  The crunch on law firm finances has thus come at the precise moment when law firms are 
already seeking alternative models to alleviate the constant upward pressure on salaries, hours, 
rates, and required incoming business, while still maintaining high enough profits to prevent 
rainmakers from fleeing to other firms. One response has been to replace some associates on the 
bottom of the pyramid with contract attorneys. These attorneys, who are hired only for temporary 
                                                 
26. See Press Release, Nat'l Ass'n for Law Placement (NALP), Salaries at Largest Firms Up Again (Aug. 21, 2008), 
available at http://www.nalp.org/salariesatlargestfirmsupagain. 
27. Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament, A Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1922 (2008). 
28. Id. 
29. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 27, at 1906. 
30. See Lawrence J. Fox, The Death of Partnership: Can We End the Trend?, in RAISE THE BAR, supra note 8, at 
103, 105. 
  9assignments, are significantly cheaper than associates, and need not be retained during slow 
periods.
31 Another common response is to increase the number of staff attorneys who either will 
not be considered for partnership or have already lost out on a promotion to partner.
32 Finally, 
some firms have begun tying associate pay to performance, rather than paying all associates in a 
lock-step compensation scheme.
33 All of these trends have intensified since the economic crisis 
began.
34 
  What does this emerging law firm model mean for new law school graduates seeking 
jobs? These trends likely will create a job market that places a greater premium on graduates 
with practical legal skills. As non-partner-track attorneys of various kinds become more 
common, firms will be able to hire fewer partner-track associates. The market power will thus 
shift to the law firms in the hiring market. At the same time, non-partner-track attorneys will take 
over many of the most monotonous and mundane tasks, such as document review, that require 
                                                 
31. See Anthony Lin, Contract Attorneys Struggle With Their Identity, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 18, 2004, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005540810 (noting that one large firm typically hires contract attorneys 
for three months at a time at about two-thirds the cost of new associates). Many firms are also seeking contract 
attorneys overseas, where the savings are even greater. This trend has been facilitated by a recent ABA Ethics 
Committee opinion approving of the practice. See ABA News Release, ABA Ethics Committee Issues Opinion 
Detailing Lawyer Responsibilities When Outsourcing Legal Work Domestically or Internationally (Aug. 25, 2008), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/release/news_release.cfm?releaseid=435. 
32. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 27, at 1875–76, 1904–05; see also Kellie Schmidt, McDermott Will to 
Add Lower-Paid Associates, RECORDER, Nov. 2, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/llf/PubArticleLLF.jsp?id= 
1193907832842 (“McDermott, Will & Emery plans to create a new tier of attorneys—think of them as permanent 
contract associates—to handle lower-end tasks at lower billing rates.”). 
33. See Carlyn Kolker, ‘Medieval’ U.S. Law Firm Pay Structure Buckles, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 16, 2009, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601127&sid=aN3ilGkywFZg&refer=law; Martha Neil, BigLaw ‘Has 
Changed Forever,’ Says Womble Carlyle, Cutting Pay 10 Percent, ABAJOURNAL.COM, Apr. 14, 2009, http://www. 
abajournal.com/news/biglaw_has_changed_forever_says_womble_firm_cutting_pay_10_percent/ (“Those with 
stellar skills and work ethics may not see any pay reduction at all.”). 
34. See Haynes, Recession Sends Lawyers Home, supra note 23 (“Across the country, the recession is putting 
increasing pressure on law firms to slash spending and discount their services. Client demand for lower prices is 
prompting firms to outsource some of their document work to India, hire more temp or contract lawyers, shift from 
billable hours to fixed fees and eliminate staff.”); see also HILDEBRANT, CLIENT ADVISORY, supra note 6, at 15 
(recommending that, in response to the economic crisis, “[f]irms that have not already done so should seriously 
consider modifying their associate compensation structures to allow a substantial portion of compensation to be tied 
to individual performance in support of the firm’s goals and strategy”). 
  10the least training. Firms will thus expect their partner-track associates to perform more complex 
work from day one, creating an incentive to hire the graduates with the most practical skills.
35 
  Under the traditional model, of course, young lawyers could have expected to receive 
such practical training on the job, and it was widely thought that large law firms provided the 
best training a young lawyer could receive.
36 As salaries and rates have skyrocketed, however, 
clients have become increasingly unwilling to pay for associate training.
37 At the same time, the 
increasing pressures on partners to both bill more hours themselves and to bring in more clients 
have decreased the amount of time partners are willing to spend mentoring young attorneys.
38 If 
new graduates without significant practical training can even get hired as partner-track 
associates, therefore, they will find it even more difficult to obtain such training at the firm. 
Another part of the changing law firm model, the increasing prevalence of alternative 
billing arrangements, will similarly promote practical skills. Many legal consulting firms are 
recommending that their clients respond to the economic crisis by moving away from hourly 
rates to billing models more attractive to clients.
39 Unlike the billable hour, these alternative 
models reward efficiency and prevent a law firm from passing part of the cost of training new 
                                                 
35. Professors Galanter and Henderson note that quality of work is a key factor in associate retention. See Galanter 
& Henderson, supra note 27, at 1893. Thus, firms can also decrease attrition and the demands of constant hiring by 
shifting drudgery away from their partner-track associates. 
36. See id. at 1870 (noting that under the traditional law firm model, “the firm establishes its brand by hiring only 
the best students from the best law schools and providing them with the best training”). 
37. See William D. Henderson, Are We Selling Results or Résumés? 7–8 (April 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/LegalProfession/documents/HendersonWebsiteArticle.pdf; see also 
Martha Neil, Some Law Firm Clients Ban 1st-Years, Says Morgan Lewis Chair, ABAJOURNAL.COM, Apr. 13, 2009, 
http://abajournal.com/news/some_clients_ban_1st-years_says_morgan_lewis_chair. 
38. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 27, at 1918 (“[I]nformal training and mentoring in most large law firms 
are on the wane because partners are reluctant to invest the time beyond what is necessary to optimize their own 
practices.”); Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral 
Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 739–46 (1998).  
39. See PAM WOLDOW, TYING OUTSIDE LEGAL COSTS TO VALUE: WILL THE CURRENT ECONOMIC CRISIS SPARK A 
RUSH TO VALUE BASED FEES? (2009), available at http://www.altmanweil.com/dir_docs/resource/9529de69-0ee2-
4a08-8e9b-8c4ad91e260c_document.pdf. 
  11lawyers along to its clients. Graduates with practical skills will therefore be in the best position 
to add the most value to these firms. 
  Significantly, there are also signs that firms are willing to take such graduates wherever 
they find them, regardless of whether they hold the traditional credentials from an elite law 
school. One law firm consultant, for example, reports that “some law firms have been pleasantly 
surprised by the performance of some experimental new hires from the top of their class at 
‘lesser’ ranked law schools.”
 40 Studies showing that school rank and grade point average are not 
the best predictors of law firm success have reinforced this openness to lower-tier schools.
41 
Professors Galanter and Henderson have thus predicted that in the new job market 
“[d]emonstrated management and teamwork skills resulting in successful client engagements 
w[ill] carry more weight than Ivy League credentials.”
42  
For the first time in several decades, the legal employment market favors firms and not 
graduates. As one would expect, the firms will thus be able to dictate their terms. With tightening 
bottom lines and increasing demands for value from clients, law firms in this position will be 
able to put a premium on graduates with practical skills.  
D.  Other Areas of the Legal Job Market 
Large law firms have a profound effect on the entire legal job market. As the flagship 
employers of the legal profession, their decisions have a trickle-down effect on a wide range of 
other areas. It is useful, therefore, to say a word about how the economic recession is affecting 
other areas of the legal job market to complement the new focus on practical skills in large firms.  
                                                 
40. Ward Bower, The War for Talent and Starting Salaries, ALTMAN WEIL, INC. REP. TO LEGAL MGMT., Apr. 2007, at 2, 
available at http://www.altmanweil.com/dir_docs/resource/aa26ed0a-08e1-422b-8605-6e42e944bb92_document.pdf. 
41. Debra Cassens Weiss, School Rank and GPA Aren’t the Best Predictors of BigLaw Success, ABAJOURNAL.COM, 
Oct. 16, 2008, http://www.abajournal.com/news/school_rank_and_gpa_arent_the_best_predictors_of_biglaw_success/. 
42. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 27, at 1927. 
  12First, smaller firms, public interest groups, government agencies, and corporate legal 
departments will have more access to top attorneys in the job market, particularly in the short 
term as attorneys laid off from large firms bloat the applicant pool. Even in the long term, 
however, larger firms hiring fewer top attorneys into the partnership track will allow other 
employers to be more selective. This effect should cascade down the market to the least 
prestigious, lowest paying jobs, with every level enjoying greater flexibility in hiring. Employers 
of lower prestige have rarely been able to invest as much in training as large firms, so one would 
naturally expect them to use this flexibility to seek out lawyers with more practical skills. Indeed, 
many small and mid-size firms are already discontinuing their summer programs for law students 
and putting resources into recruiting more experienced attorneys.
43  
Second, the federal government’s response to the financial crisis will also cause greater 
demand for young lawyers with practical skills. The government will likely employ an increasing 
number of lawyers in the coming years as the Obama Administration implements the stimulus 
package and enhances government programs.
44 Moreover, after the initial glut of layoffs from 
large firms, the new large law firm model with less attrition will mean fewer attorneys seeking to 
make lateral moves into government. The government will thus have to rely more on new 
graduates to fill its ranks. Traditionally, the government has emphasized practical experience in 
hiring, because 
[u]nlike large firms, most government employers don’t have the luxury of hiring entry-
level lawyers simply to do legal research. Lean budgets mean lawyers are given lots of 
responsibility right away. . . . Government hiring attorneys, therefore, emphasize the 
                                                 
43. Press Release, Robert Denney Associates, Inc., What’s Hot and What’s Not in the Legal Profession (July 2008), 
available at http://www.robertdenney.com/pdf/comm-legal-hot-not-july2008.pdf. 
44. Dona DeZube, Stimulus Package to Increase Government Hiring, MYJOURNALCOURIER.COM, Apr. 20, 2009, 
http://www.myjournalcourier.com/articles/government-1169-syndication-hiring-increase.html (predicting that the 
federal government will add 200,000 jobs over the next three years, many of them attorney positions).  
  13practical skills applicants bring to the table, not the prestige of attending a particular law 
school.
45 
Even though the government will have to hire more attorneys directly out of law school, they 
will still expect these attorneys to have practical training. The pressures from this job market will 
also put a premium on practical experience.  
The job market’s new emphasis on graduates capable of practicing law right away will 
thus come from multiple areas. The looming question is then whether law schools will be in a 
position to provide such graduates. This Essay therefore now turns its attention to law schools.  
II.  THE COMING CRISIS IN LEGAL EDUCATION 
A.  The “Unfolding Education Hoax” 
The cost of legal education has been rising steadily throughout the extended expansion of 
the legal market during the last thirty years. Beginning in the 1980s, law school tuition has 
consistently risen at a rate more than two times the rate of inflation.
46 Between 1992 and 2002, 
inflation was twenty-eight percent, while the cost of legal education rose 134 percent at public 
schools and seventy-six percent at private schools.
47 Since 2002, tuition has continued to rise 
anywhere from five to fifteen percent a year.
48 In 2007, the average tuition at a private law 
school was $32,367, and at public law schools, $15,455.
49 When one includes books and living 
expenses, the overall annual cost of attendance is $50,000 or more. As a result, many law 
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2005, at 5. 
46. Maimon Schwarzschild, The Ethics and Economics of American Legal Education Today, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 3, 5 (2008); see also THE ABA COMMISSION ON LOAN REPAYMENT AND FORGIVENESS, LIFTING THE BURDEN: 
LAW STUDENT DEBT AS A BARRIER TO PUBLIC SERVICE 16 (Chicago 2003) [hereinafter LIFTING THE BURDEN]. 
47. LIFTING THE BURDEN, supra note 46, at 10. 
48. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LAW SCHOOL TUITION 1985–2007 (2007), available 
at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/charts/stats%20-%205.pdf. 
49. Id. 
  14students graduate today with over $100,000 in debt, regardless of the rank of the school they 
attend.
50 
  Moreover, tuition will likely continue to rise as the effects of the financial crisis become 
fully apparent. Nearly every school in the country is facing a significant decline in revenue 
because of decreased funding from state sources, declining endowments, and a drop in 
fundraising.
51 While part of these deficits can be made up in budget cuts, many schools have no 
choice but to raise tuition by double digit amounts.
52 
  To make matters worse, these increases are coming at a time when the availability of 
student loans is increasingly precarious as a result of the credit crisis. Many private student 
lenders had already stepped away from the market after the College Cost Reduction and Access 
Act of 2007 decreased the percentage of private loans guaranteed by the government. Since then, 
the credit market has frozen, forcing more lenders out of the market and making it difficult for 
those that remain to raise capital.
53 The Federal government has agreed to pick up the slack by 
buying more loans itself, and President Obama has proposed that the government cease 
subsidizing private loans altogether in favor of a public-financing system.
54 Nonetheless, there 
are no guarantees that the public sector will continue to stomach costly subsidies to the legal 
profession, and public control of law student loans may carry some unpleasant strings that serve 
to restrict access. 
                                                 
50. Schwarzschild, supra note 46, at 6; see also LIFTING THE BURDEN, supra note 46, at 17 n.7 (reporting the median 
student debt upon graduation in 2002 to be as high as $84,400). 
51. Karen Sloan, Law schools dealing with budget cuts, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 19, 2009, available at http://www.law.com/ 
jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202427496279; see also Amanda Bronstad, Law school fundraising tightens, NAT’L 
L.J., Oct 27, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202425539593. 
52. Id. (reporting that Florida State University College of Law has proposed a fifteen percent increase in tuition for 
next year).  
53. Doug Lederman, Obama’s Budget Blockbuster, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.insidehighered. 
com/news/2009/02/27/budget. 
54. Id. 
  15Even if loans continue to be readily available, however, only a small percentage of law 
school graduates are in a solid position to pay back their loans. In 2007 the median salary of new 
graduates was $62,000,
55 a level at which servicing debt loads over $100,000 is, at best, difficult. 
Salaries are likely to decline in the current job market, even as debt loads rise, so this situation 
will not likely improve. Finally, some schools are considering paring back financial aid programs 
in response to the recession.
56 All of these trends suggest that, at least in the short term, legal 
education will become increasingly unaffordable for many students. 
A recent Forbes article describes the debt burden of law school graduates as “an 
unfolding education hoax on the middle class that's just as insidious, and nearly as sweeping, as 
the housing debacle.”
57 Students may finally be waking up to the reality of this hoax, however. 
Applications to law schools have declined sharply from a peak of 100,600 in 2005 to 83,400 in 
2008.
58 Some potential students are thus realizing that a law degree may not be a cost-effective 
investment. Even more telling is that the economic crisis has not reversed this decline. Typically 
applications to graduate school increase significantly during a recession; the number of 
applicants to law school jumped 17.6 percent following the recession of 2001-2002, for 
example.
59 This time, however, the number of applicants to law school for the fall of 2008 
decreased 0.8 percent from the fall of 2007.
60 Early evidence suggests that that the number of 
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  16applicants has increased slightly for the fall of 2009,
61 but not nearly as much as historical jumps 
during a recession would lead one to expect. Moreover, anecdotal evidence of increases in 
applications at top schools
62 suggests that there may still be a decline among applicants to lower-
tier law schools, who have the least chance of making a salary capable of servicing their debt 
upon graduation. 
If the number of law school applicants remains low, law schools may see a market shift 
analogous to that in the employment market: power will shift away from the law schools and to 
potential students. As the number of overall applicants decreases, it will become increasingly 
difficult for schools to fill their classes with qualified applicants. Schools will need to compete 
ferociously for the diminished number of qualified applicants, however, both to maintain their 
U.S. News and World Report ranking
63 and because a school with better students generally has a 
better educational environment.
64 Schools will thus face significant pressure to adjust their 
programs to be as attractive to students as possible. 
To confront this challenge, law schools will need to realize what is keeping students 
away: the prospect of taking on debt too high to support in the current job market. The schools 
that figure out how to make their graduates more competitive in the coming job market, while at 
the same time limiting the cost of a legal education, will be most attractive in this situation. 
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  17Because the job market will favor job-seekers with proven practical training,
65 the market will 
ultimately reward law schools that can deliver a skills education at a reasonable price. 
The pressure on law schools to emphasize skills should not be overstated, of course. 
Graduates from elite schools will likely still be able to secure high-paying jobs, and these schools 
will thus continue to attract the most-qualified students. Indeed, many elite schools have seen a 
sharp increase in applications during this recession.
66 For more marginal law schools, however, 
the new job market will present a significant challenge. Such schools will only attract students if 
they can ensure them a good return on their investment. Many law schools will thus face more 
pressure than ever before to emphasize practical training. 
B.  Overcoming the Barriers to Reform 
If the economic crisis has a silver lining, it may be this potential to catalyze a greater 
emphasis on practical training in American law schools. A number of reports over the last 
century have recommended that legal education move in precisely this direction, including most 
recently the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar’s 1992 MacCrate 
Report
67 and the 2007 Carnegie Foundation Report Educating Lawyers.
68 These calls for reform 
have had some effect, leading to a growth in the skills training curriculum that the MacCrate 
Report calls “[u]questionably, the most significant development in legal education in the post-
World War II era.”
69 More clinical courses, simulations, and other practical skills courses are 
available than ever before.
70  
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  18Nonetheless, the traditional law school curriculum has proved remarkably resilient, 
resisting integration with the new skills training curriculum and keeping it on the “periphery” of 
legal education.
71 Professor John Sonsteng, surveying the landscape just a couple of years ago, 
concluded that: 
Law schools successfully train students in eight of seventeen key legal practice skill 
areas, but students must seek other sources of training in the remaining nine legal practice 
skill areas and in all the legal management skill areas. As with the apprentice systems of 
early legal education, the most substantial practical training a modern lawyer receives is 
outside the formal legal education system. A century of studies confirms that the formal 
legal education process does not live up to its promise to train students to practice law.
72 
Professor Sonsteng identified a number of factors that have discouraged reform, including the 
resistance of traditional tenure-track faculty who prefer to focus on research, the lack of 
meaningful assessment of graduates’ capabilities, the emphasis of law school rankings on 
prestige and research output rather than practical skills and teaching, and the high cost of 
implementing a skills curriculum.
73 Together, these factors ensure that, to the extent that reform 
has come, law schools have simply added a skills curriculum to their current programming rather 
than changing current practices by reforming curricula or reallocating resources. As three 
observers of clinical education put it,  
[b]ecause any shift of resources from other parts of the law school budget to the clinics is 
likely to provoke considerable resistance from the constituencies that are adversely 
affected, some law schools will only consider such a measure as a last resort. It is more 
likely that a law school would explore ways to leverage faculty teaching clinical courses 
                                                 
71. Id. at 32–41. 
72. Sonsteng et al., supra note 19, at 388–89. 
73. Id. at 333–63.  
  19to do more or would explore ways to expand the budget to allow for the growth of in-
house clinical programs.
74 
To the extent that law schools do recognize the importance of skills training, therefore, they still 
insist on “having their cake and eating it too.” This addition of a skills curriculum without cuts 
elsewhere has been one of the major drivers of tuition increases at law schools over the last 
several decades.
75 For example, between 1977 and 1988, law schools’ expenditures on in-house 
clinical education rose by 92.5 percent, while the overall increase in law school expenditures was 
nearly twice as much, at 173.9 percent.
76 Far from raising funds for skills education by 
decreasing other expenditures, therefore, law schools continued to increase funding in other areas 
by an even greater amount. A significant chunk of this increase in funding has gone to subsidize 
academic research,
77 an enhancement that does little to improve the practical abilities of 
students. In this way, law schools can pay lip service to skills training while maintaining a true 
emphasis on faculty research and writing and protecting their “prestige” score in the U.S. News 
rankings. The Carnegie Report calls this approach merely “additive,” and suggests that it is 
inferior to a more comprehensive “integrative” approach in which practical skills are work
the traditional curriculum.
ed into 
78  
                                                
C.  Rethinking Priorities: The Questionable Value of Legal Scholarship Today 
  Even as law schools have continued to pour resources into academic scholarship, this 
scholarship has become increasingly disconnected from the concerns of practicing lawyers. 
 
74. Barry et al., supra note 4, at 26–27; accord Sonsteng et al., supra note 19, at 340 (“Barriers to change are also 
apparent in the faculty attitudes which define and tend to separate substantive and skills-based courses.”). 
75. Daniel J. Morrissey, Saving Legal Education, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 254, 259 (2006) (“As the work of clinical and 
legal writing professors was accepted as a career calling, it has become necessary for law school budgets to include 
a greater salary allocation to them. Such additional permanent positions, of course, . . . increase the overall expenses 
of a school's operation . . . .”). 
76. Barry et al., supra note 4, at 22. 
77. See Schwarzschild, supra note 46, at 4–7 (describing the increasing “subsidy” that law schools have given to 
academic research by raising faculty salaries, decreasing teaching loads, and hiring more traditional faculty). 
78. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 68, at 191–92. 
  20Professor Anthony Kronman argues that the two most influential academic legal movements of 
the last half century—law and economics and critical legal studies—both downplay the 
importance of practical legal skills and “depreciate[] the value of practical wisdom.”
79 Both of 
these movements seek to explain developments in law through reference to other disciplines, 
rather than cultivating the skills unique to a lawyer that are most relevant in a practice setting. 
Law and economics seeks to give law scientific precision through the application of the social 
sciences in an academic fashion, rather than emphasizing doctrinal analysis and traditional 
modes of legal reasoning.
80 Critical legal studies looks to define law through the underlying 
social outlook of those who create and administer it, again at the expense of more traditional 
doctrinal analysis.
81 
The twin dominance of these schools of thought in the legal academy means that few 
works of scholarship today provide anything of use to practicing attorneys or judges. As Judge 
Harry Edwards put it,  
[o]ur law reviews are now full of mediocre interdisciplinary articles. Too many law 
professors are ivory tower dilettantes, pursuing whatever subject piques their interest, 
whether or not the subject merits scholarship, and whether or not they have the scholarly 
skills to master it. 
. . . . 
I sense from academic writings and from ceaseless comments that I hear from 
colleagues in the profession that, at least at a number of the so-called “elite” law schools, 
there is no longer a healthy balance between “impractical” and “practical” 
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  21scholars. . . . [T]oo few law professors are producing articles or treatises that have direct 
utility for judges, administrators, legislators, and practitioners . . . .
82 
Moreover, this emphasis on scholarship has a significant negative effect on the experience of 
most law students: 
The law student who merely takes a variety of pure theory courses, and learns that 
“practitioners [a]re sell outs,” will be woefully unprepared for legal practice. That student 
will lack the basic doctrinal skills: the capacity to analyze, interpret and apply cases, 
statutes, and other legal texts. More generally, the student will not understand how to 
practice as a professional. He or she will have gained the impression that law practice is 
necessarily grubby, materialistic, and self-interested and will not understand, in a 
concrete way, what professional practice means.
83 
In short, the more that a professor is engrossed in the production of legal scholarship of marginal 
relevance to practice, the fewer practical skills a student will be able to learn from him.  
Law schools facing the realities of the new job market will thus need to reconsider their 
prioritizing of legal scholarship over practical training. Although law schools have made some 
strides toward developing a skills curriculum, they have not yet confronted the difficult tradeoffs 
required to do so in a cost-effective manner. Despite the barriers to reform that have slowed the 
development of skills training in the past, the economic crisis means that law schools will have 
an unprecedented incentive to evaluate each part of their curriculum and the contribution it 
makes to the training of their graduates. Over the coming decade, law schools may be more 
willing to integrate skills training into the traditional curriculum or to cut the subsidy for 
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  22academic research. This Essay thus now turns to the question of how the ABA Section of Legal 
Education and Admissions to the Bar can assist this necessary transformation.  
III.  HOW THE ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND  
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR CAN HELP 
 
  The ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar is the accrediting 
agency for law schools in America. Although it has been criticized frequently for using this 
power to maintain a monopoly over legal education,
84 it remains the nerve center for a wide 
variety of interest groups touching every aspect of legal education. As such, it possesses a unique 
ability to coordinate any broad response to the economic crisis. This Essay now turns to several 
steps the Section can take to assist the transformation of American legal education as it responds 
to the demands of the economic crisis. These steps fall into two categories. First, the Section can 
improve the dissemination of information to prospective law students, thus facilitating the 
market-driven transformation of law school programming in a pragmatic direction. Second, it 
can reformulate its requirements on faculty composition, recruitment, and tenure, to ensure that 
law schools have the flexibility they need to be competitive in the new market.   
A.  Providing More Consumer Information 
The argument of this Essay so far assumes the proper functioning of markets. Because 
legal employers will seek graduates with more practical experience, graduates with such 
experience will be better positioned to find a job and pay off their loans. Prospective students 
should, in turn, demand schools that will provide this practical training at a reasonable cost. If a 
school cannot prepare them to be competitive in the new job market, students should not choose 
to attend that school.  
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  23The functioning of this second market depends on students having adequate information 
to decide whether to attend law school, and to pick the right law school. One of the most critical 
criteria for this decision is whether a school can provide enough training to secure a job at which 
the student will be able to pay for the cost of his education. Only if students actually award 
schools that focus on practical training with their attendance will schools feel the pressure to 
change.  
And yet, although an unparalleled amount of information is available,
85 potential students 
may be more ill-informed on this point than ever before. The Forbes article quoted above 
identifies the lack of accurate information in this area as one of the key components of the higher 
education “hoax” that schools are perpetuating, describing higher education as “a self-serving 
establishment trading in half-truths that exaggerate the value of its product.”
86 A Wall Street 
Journal article recently identified the same problem, noting that “[s]tudents entering law school 
have little way of knowing how tight a job market they might face. The only employment data 
that many prospective students see comes from school-promoted surveys that provide a far-from-
complete portrait of graduate experiences.”
87 The article reports that one law school advertised a 
median salary upon graduation of $135,000, but based the number on a survey of only twenty-
four percent of students at the top of the class.
88 Another school reported a median salary of over 
$100,000 for students at firms, but included fewer than half of the schools graduates in the 
survey.
89 Even schools who try to report accurate data may be over-reporting salaries, the article 
notes, because those who are unemployed or make less money may be too embarrassed to 
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  24respond.  The biggest problem, however, is that most schools do not report this data, and most 
prospective students do not consider it. As the MacCrate Report noted almost two decades ago: 
Law school administrators know the strengths and weaknesses of their own institutions 
and should be candid in discussing them with applicants. Catalogs and application 
materials should provide the kinds of information that will enable candidates to make 
informed decisions. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. . . . Schools could be the 
source of considerable information about such concerns, about the pressures of law 
school and practice, about the kinds of work their graduates do, and about the financial 
and personal implications of different legal careers. . . . [but] schools are not doing a good 
job of distinguishing themselves from one another.
90  
The problem is exacerbated by the dominance of the U.S. News and World Report 
rankings. According to the Wall Street Journal, “[p]rospective students are voracious readers of 
the annual U.S. News rankings” and frequently rely on them to inform their decisions about law 
schools.
91 The rankings, however, are not well correlated with the return a student can expect on 
his investment, particularly after one gets past the elite schools at the top.
92 Indeed, the need to 
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Speak Out, http://www.lsac.org/Choosing/deans-speak-out-rankings.asp (letter endorsed by over one hundred deans 
criticizing the U.S. News rankings as “inherently flawed”).  
  25move up in the rankings often encourages schools to make changes that diminish their ability to 
provide practical training at a reasonable cost, precisely the most important factor for students 
entering the new job market. Forty percent of the rankings score now comes from prestige, a 
factor often based on the amount and quality of research a school produces. Thus, it encourages 
schools to focus on a scholar’s academic output, rather than on his teaching ability, and to 
increase tuition to pay for more research while transferring resources from other areas.
93 Finally, 
schools frequently manipulate the rankings by reporting false data.
94   
The ABA Section of Legal Education could mitigate these problems by ensuring that 
students have the information they need to accurately assess different law schools, especially in 
the area of employment after graduation. Professors William Henderson and Andrew Morriss 
have already suggested such a course of action: 
Law schools, acting through their accrediting agency, the ABA, could authorize NALP to 
compile and publish school-level salary and employment information. Providing 
information on the distribution of salaries of recent graduates would, for example, allow 
students a realistic method of comparing their expected debt levels to their ability to pay 
off student loans after graduation. Salaries have the potential to exert a large anchoring 
effect on law student expectations; furthermore, average salaries can be substantially 
affected by a small fraction of students obtaining lucrative large firm employment. 
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  26Therefore, a more useful and accurate summary of information would provide a detailed 
breakdown of employment type by law schools.
95 
Alternatively, the Section could amend Standard 509 to require law schools to provide this 
information directly to potential applicants. Under either system, of course, schools would still 
feel the temptation to manipulate this data to their advantage. Thus, the Accreditation Committee 
and site teams should confirm that a school is reporting accurate data and that all of its 
promotional materials are honestly representing the school’s information.  
  In addition to providing more useful information to graduates, making such data public 
may encourage U.S. News to change its rankings methodology. Other than the controversial 
prestige score, the U.S. News rankings criteria closely track the information the Section requires 
schools to report. U.S. News currently considers incoming students’ LSAT scores, undergraduate 
GPA, and acceptance rate, graduates’ employment rate and bar passage rate, and the school’s 
expenditures per student, student/faculty ratio, and library resources. The Section requires law 
schools to report each of these data under Standard 509.
96 Using information that is already 
publicly available is much cheaper than gathering new information, so this strategy makes sense 
for U.S. News. Whatever the reason, however, the U.S. News criteria closely track the Section’s 
reporting requirements.    
Moreover, U.S. News has explicitly signaled that its criteria will follow the information 
the Section requires in the accreditation process. Several recent changes in the Section’s law 
school questionnaire provide a case in point. According to the 2009 edition of the U.S. News 
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  27rankings, “[w]hen the American Bar Association's 2008 Annual Questionnaire changed how law 
schools reported their first-time test takers bar passage results to the same calendar year, U.S. 
News changed our calculations.”
97 Similarly, the magazine noted that “[w]hen the American Bar 
Association's 2008 Annual Questionnaire changed how law schools categorized their 
unemployed students into either unemployed and seeking and unemployed and not seeking, U.S. 
News changed our calculations.”
98 Thus, the Section should not underestimate its influence on 
the U.S. News rankings. Simply by changing the information law schools must produce, the 
Section may change the rankings system.  
This gives the Section significant power to lessen the perverse incentives the rankings 
provide for a law school to increase its “prestige” at the expense of its current students’ 
educational experience. By forcing law schools to divulge more and more accurate information 
about the outcome of its students’ education, the Section can encourage U.S. News to emphasize 
the same factors in its rankings. Even if the U.S. News criteria stopped tracking the reporting 
requirements, however, the Section could still continue to ensure that schools provide accurate 
information themselves, thus providing more information for students to make their decisions. 
With accurate information available, the market should then take over as students who wish to 
succeed in the job market gravitate to those schools most able to facilitate their success.  
B.  Help from the Bar and the Bench: Reconsidering the Use of Adjunct Faculty 
As schools react to these market pressures, they will likely try a wide variety of tactics 
and innovations to improve their education at a low cost. Many of these innovations can be 
accomplished while remaining well within the current accreditation standards.
99  For example, 
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99. See Sonsteng, supra note 19, at 439–41. 
  28Professor John Sonsteng has noted that the accreditation standards treat tenure-track and full-
time contract faculty identically for purposes of calculating the student/faculty ratio.
100 
Consequently, a school could replace half of its tenure-track faculty with twice as many full-time 
contract faculty, thus providing three times the number of teaching hours at a comparable cost.
101   
Transferring resources away from scholarship and toward teaching in this way would provide 
schools with significant opportunities to improve their practical training.  
Other potential innovations are currently discouraged by the accreditation standards, 
however. Many of these restrictions are necessary to ensure that students do not receive a subpar 
education. Students should not be treated as guinea pigs, nor should a school be allowed to 
jeopardize educational quality in the name of reducing costs. Nonetheless, the Section must 
ensure that its standards do not unnecessarily restrict innovation. One area of potential concern is 
the standards’ treatment of adjunct faculty. Practicing lawyers and judges are uniquely situated to 
help schools address the challenge of providing a practical education at a reasonable cost, and the 
standards should not restrict schools from experimenting in this area. 
1.  Potential Benefits Of Adjuncts 
Adjuncts are particularly well suited to help law schools face the current crisis, both as a 
way of saving money and improving the transference of practical skills to students.  Adjuncts are 
typically paid a flat fee for each course that they teach. While these fees vary, estimates usually 
run between $1500 and $5000, depending on the experience of the teacher, the quality of the 
school, the length of the course, and the number of students.
102 Even assuming the higher 
                                                 
100. Id. at 439. 
101. Id. at 469–71. 
102. See David A. Lander, Are Adjuncts a Benefit or a Detriment? 33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 285, 289 (2008). 
  29number, a law school could hire twenty-five adjuncts for every full professor earning salary and 
benefits of $125,000 a year.
103  
In addition to providing huge cost savings, adjuncts are also well-suited to help schools 
integrate the practical and theoretical aspects of legal education. Because of their ongoing 
practice experience, “adjuncts will have an enhanced sense of how to meld the theoretical and 
the practical, and they are generally more focused upon how to use the law strategically to 
accomplish client goals.”
104 This unique experience allows adjuncts to supplement the traditional 
teaching students receive from full-time faculty, and gives them a unique credibility to teach the 
nuts and bolts of law practice to their students.  
Adjuncts can also help a school provide a wider variety of course offerings, thus giving 
students the opportunity to develop a unique specialty that will make them more competitive in 
the job market.  Few schools have the resources to provide a full-time faculty member with 
detailed knowledge of every area of the law. Adjuncts can help to fill in the gaps, often teaching 
courses like sports law, intellectual property, entertainment law, bankruptcy, and upper-level 
commercial law offerings.
105 Finally, adjuncts are well-connected in the job market and can 
provide assistance to students looking for employment. 
2.  Potential Downsides of Adjuncts, and How They Can Be Mitigated 
There are potential downsides to the use of adjuncts. Adjuncts are typically less available 
to students than full-time faculty, complete less scholarship in the areas in which they teach, are 
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  30less integrated into the law school culture, and may be inexperienced teachers.
106 These 
criticisms of adjuncts are all accurate, and any school that wants to increase its use of adjuncts 
should be fully aware of the potential risks. There have been a number of articles and guides 
published recently to help schools avoid these pitfalls, and schools should take advantage of 
them.
107 The Section has already provided guidance in this area with the publication of its 
Adjunct Faculty Handbook,
108 and it should continue explore the benefits and dangers of using 
adjunct faculty while providing guidance to schools in this area.  
For example, schools can mitigate the harm from the lower availability of adjuncts by 
taking advantage of the smaller class sizes adjuncts allow. Four adjuncts teaching four courses of 
twenty students each may provide more face time per student than a single full-time faculty 
member teaching a typical course of eighty students. Second, schools must be careful to invest 
sufficient time in the hiring and training of adjuncts.
109 Interviews should include a presentation 
by the candidate to gauge teaching ability, and schools should ensure that the full-time faculty 
regularly review and critique adjunct teaching. Adjuncts who perform poorly should not be 
rehired. Schools should also recognize the unique strengths of adjuncts and use them where they 
will be most effective, including as teaching assistants to full-time faculty in legal writing or 
clinical courses, and to teach specialized upper-level courses.
110  
Schools should also take advantage of opportunities to integrate adjuncts into the 
classroom with full-time faculty. For example, Harvard Law School’s new Problems and 
Methods course for first-year students will include small groups of students working with an 
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  31adjunct on a particular practice problem introduced in class by a full-time professor. Not only 
will the students benefit from this experience, but the adjuncts will have the advantage of 
observing the full-time professor at work, thus providing the school with an experienced pool of 
adjuncts to draw on later to teach other courses.  
A school that can use adjuncts effectively and manage them well should be able to 
improve its educational program while restraining the rise in tuition. Given the challenges that 
legal education faces today, one can expect that many schools will want to explore this way of 
giving their students a competitive advantage in the new job market.    
3.  The Accreditation Standards’ Effect on Law Schools’ Use of Adjuncts 
  Currently, the standards include a number of provisions that limit a school’s use of 
adjuncts. Standard 402, for example, significantly discounts the value of adjuncts in calculating a 
school’s student/faculty ratio.
111 Adjuncts count as only one-fifth of a full-time faculty member 
for this purpose, even though they typically teach about one-third of the courses a full professor 
teaches. Even more significantly, all part-time teachers can constitute no more than twenty 
percent of the full-time faculty for purposes of calculating the ratio.
112 In other words, a school 
gets no credit for every teacher it hires in this category beyond twenty percent of the full-time 
faculty. For a school seeking to gain accreditation, or simply to move up in the U.S. News 
rankings,
113 these restrictions provide a significant disincentive to hire adjunct faculty.  
  Second, Standard 403 requires that “[t[he full-time faculty . . . teach the major portion of 
the law school’s curriculum, including substantially all of the first one-third of each student’s 
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  32course work.”
114 This requirement restricts a school’s ability to experiment with the first-year 
curriculum by including practical courses that make greater use of adjuncts. Even in the upper-
level courses, this standard prevents schools from using adjuncts significantly more than they are 
already.
115 Any innovation seeking to increase the use of adjuncts will thus be severely 
restrict
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cation in practical skills, the benefits of adjuncts are simply too great to be 
overlooked.   
s 
ways that a school can achieve this end, and no two schools’ solution will look the same. As long 
                                                
ed.  
These standards were all developed with the potential downsides of adjuncts in mind, and 
they reflect the reality that a school can abuse the use of adjuncts by putting them in courses they 
are ill-suited to teach and providing insufficient oversight and training. Rather than discouraging
the use of adjuncts altogether, however, the Section should invest its resources in ensuring tha
law schools are using adjuncts appropriately. Thus, the Section should consider relaxing the 
standards that discourage schools from using adjuncts. Not every law school will want t
more adjunct faculty, but the option should be available. As schools seek to provide an 
affordable edu
CONCLUSION 
The economic recession presents a unique opportunity for legal education to shift it
priorities. Rather than using student money to subsidize academic research from full-time 
professors, successful schools will need to seek new ways to train students in practical skills. 
Only then will schools continue to be able to attract qualified students. There are many different 
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courses, taught by adjuncts. 
  33as prospective students have sufficient information and schools have the flexibility to try 
different solutions, however, the law schools with the best programs will begin to rise to the top.   
Legal educators have spent much of the last century thinking about how to integrate 
practical training into the law school curriculum. To echo the MacCrate Report, “[i]n 
sum . . . the time has come to put the pieces together.”
116  
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